



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

bad. Yet all the evidence which we have goes to show that the great bankers and business men of Germany were simply swept along in the rush of governmental actions and policies suddenly disclosed, and that ever since the possibility of an immediate victory disappeared, they have been insistent in pressing for peace on the best terms obtainable.

Professor Millioud examines, and dismisses as unsatisfactory, each of what he describes as the four prevalent explanations of why Germany declared war. It was not a counter-blow against the suddenly imminent "Russian peril". It was not expression of the Nietzschean doctrine that might is right and war the proper assertion of it. That pleasing theory, the author states, was effect, not cause. The war was not a blow to free Germany from the strangle-hold of the surrounding powers; no such strangle-hold existed. Nor was it, so thinks the author, an attempt to achieve lasting prosperity through crushing and financially ruining commercial competitors. Germany, he holds, was perfectly well aware beforehand that in a long war she had economically more to lose than her antagonists; especially with England one of them.

These explanations once disposed of, Professor Millioud asserts that his own explanation, of a desperate recourse to avert or obscure the approaching financial crisis, is established. The conclusion will not be readily admitted. It leaves quite out of account the gospel of hate, the fanaticism over a coming trial of strength with France or England, the belief, not only in Germany's invincibility but in the certainty of her speedy victory with a huge indemnity, which had for years possessed the mind of the dominant military caste in Germany. The secrecy and suddenness with which what appeared to be their opportunity was seized by them—even the Kaiser possibly being taken unawares—is no bad evidence of a long-postponed but predetermined purpose. It is possible, indeed, to apply to this military caste the supposition applied by Professor Millioud to the commercial magnates. May not the Junker party, rather than the banking and exporting group, have foreseen the probable downfall of their power in Germany; a personal catastrophe which could be averted only by an early and successful war?

ALEXANDER D. NOYES.

The War of Democracy: the Allies' Statement. (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company. 1917. Pp. xxiv, 441. \$2.00.)

THE subtitle is misleading. This volume does not contain any of the official utterances which have defined the position and purpose of the Entente Allies.

We do find, however, a score of brief essays and interviews, concisely and forcefully phrased, in which fifteen eminent statesmen and publicists offer their individual judgments upon some of the issues of the war. Ten of the fifteen are English; two are French; one is Belgian; one, Dutch; and one, Alsatian. Nearly half of the volume is

filled with selections from four men: Mr. Balfour on maritime questions, Professor Gilbert Murray on ethical and cultural issues, Viscount Grey on various aims for which Great Britain is contending, and Viscount Bryce, who strikes the keynote for the volume in a general introduction. In addition to that, Lord Bryce discusses "Neutral Nations and the War", and, in a third essay, declares Great Britain to be the defender of five principles, *viz.*: liberty, nationality, maintenance of treaty obligations, humane regulation of methods of warfare, and the triumph of the pacific over the military type of civilization.

In passing it may be noted that on page xi of the introduction, Viscount Bryce has by a strange oversight assigned the Russo-Japanese War to the year 1901 instead of 1904-1905.

Mr. Edward Price Bell, London correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, contributes an interview with Lord Haldane concerning the latter's visit to Germany in 1912. A prominent Alsatian lawyer and Francophile, Paul Albert Helmer, discusses German rule in his country. A Belgian statesman and a Dutch professor render a similar service concerning Belgium. Professor Henri Hauser of the university of Dijon writes of German industry as a factor making for war, and Maurice Barrès pictures "The Soul of France" as typified by Sister Julie at Gerbéviller-le-Martyr. H. A. L. Fisher considers "The Value of Small States", and G. M. Trevelyan provides a very short account of the Serbian race. One chapter contains a history of the Cavell case; in another Lloyd George tells an Italian journalist why the Allies will win, and in a third is Mr. Asquith's speech in reply to the German chancellor in April, 1916. Mr. Balfour's discussion of naval questions comes no nearer to our time than the summer of 1915, and this fact suggests the most obvious comment upon this whole volume. It is not keyed to the present moment. It meets no present vital need. The entry of the United States into the war and the overturn in Russia have profoundly altered the "War of Democracy". This book contains nothing about the vanished Russia of the Czar, and it is equally dumb about the Russia of Kerensky.

The volume entitled *The War and Democracy*, which Messrs. Seton-Watson, Wilson, Zimmern, and Greenwood published in 1915, is incomparably superior to this one in value for either the student or the general reader. The book which interprets the significance of the war in its relation to recent democratic policies and progress is not yet written.

C. H. LEVERMORE.

The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe. By LEÓN DOMINIAN. (New York: Published for the American Geographical Society of New York by Henry Holt and Company. 1917. Pp. xviii, 375. \$3.00.)

THE publication of this book is timely. Questions of nationality are